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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under U.C.A. §78-
2a-3(2)(j) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues raise questions of law. The 
Appellate Court reviews questions of law for correctness, 
giving no deference to the trial court. Reeves v. Gentile, 
813 P.2d 111 (Utah 1991). 
(a) Was Energy Management Corporation's offer of 
lifetime employment until retirement for the rest 
of Mr. Luck's career too equivocal and unclear to 
be enforced against it as a matter of law because 
the offer did not state a specific retirement age 
and did not enumerate specific grounds for 
resignation or termination? 
3 
(b) As a matter of law, are there no set of facts 
under which termination based on objection to 
lawful employment of a member of the terminated 
employee's household can invoke the public policy 
exception to at-will employment? 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
RULE 
U.R.C.P. 56 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
When viewed in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment, the facts are as follows: 
Energy Management Corporation offered Steve Luck 
lifetime employment until retirement for the rest of his 
career. No specific retirement age was stated in the offer. 
No specific grounds for resignation or termination were 
enumerated. 
Steve Luck accepted the offer and both sides performed 
under the agreement until Steve Luck's son went to work for a 
competitor, at which time Energy Management Corporation fired 
4 
Steve Luck because it objected to having a member of Steve 
Luck's immediate household work for a competitor. 
Steve Luck brought this action against Energy 
Management Corporation for wrongful termination. In the court 
below, Judge Homer Wilkinson stated in open court that while 
it might be reversible error to do so, he was granting summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The offer and acceptance of lifetime employment for 
the rest of Mr. Luck's career until retirement was not so 
unclear and equivocal as to preclude a trial. 
2. The public policy exception to at-will employment 
should be extended to protect an employee from termination of 
employment based solely or primarily on the conduct of 
persons who live in the same household as the employee. The 
right to live with a son is a legal right and could be a public 
duty, bringing to bear two of the three public policy 
categories noted in Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 
1992) . Termination based on the conduct of another (Mr. Luck's 
son) is contrary to the policy behind public employment 
5 
statutes which clearly prohibit termination based on outside 
factors not related to the merit of the employee, and said 
public employment statutes can be referenced as a statement of 
public policy applicable to private employment under Peterson 
v. Browning, supra. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE PARTIES' MUTUAL AGREEMENT OF LIFETIME EMPLOYMENT 
FOR THE REST OF MR. LUCK'S CAREER UNTIL RETIREMENT PRECLUDES 
THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST MR. LUCK. 
The trial court stated in open court that while the 
court was "not persuaded a hundred percent that this is a 
case for summary judgment" (T.13 Line 18) and that the court 
might be "making reversible error" (T.13 Line 22) summary 
judgment would enter against Mr. Luck anyway. (T.13 Line 
23). The trial court incorrectly viewed the record in the 
light most favorable to the movant instead of correctly 
viewing the record in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment and ascertaining what material 
facts are actually and in good faith controverted. 
U.R.C.P. 56. The trial court did make reversible error. 
6 
It was and is Mr. Luck's position that the trial court 
was correct in its statement that it might be reversible 
error to enter summary judgment, that indeed it was 
reversible error to do so, and that the error should indeed 
be reversed in a de novo review for correctness on appeal. 
When viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Luck, the 
facts show that the president of Energy Management Corporation 
offered Mr. Luck lifetime employment for the rest of Mr. 
Luck's career until retirement, that Mr. Luck accepted the 
offer, and that both parties performed under the agreement. 
This was sufficient under Utah law to create an oral contract 
of continued employment absent just cause to end the 
employment. Hodgson v. Bunzi Utah, Inc. 844 P.2d 331 (1992). 
At the hearing, Mr. Luck's counsel quoted directly from 
the deposition testimony of Mr. Luck cited at page three of 
defendant's memorandum: "he offered me an increase in 
pay, and at the time he offered to—asked me if I would 
consider then totally making the commitment to go to them and 
work for the rest of my life. And his words were, I don't 
want you to quit. If you're going to work for me, I want you 
to stay." (T.5 Line 20). 
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When Mr. Luck's counsel refers to the language 
"(w)ould you consider totally making a commitment to go to 
work for the rest of your life" (T.7 Line 16) paraphrasing 
"he offered to—asked me if I would consider then totally 
making the commitment to go to them and work for the 
rest of my life" (T.5 Line 21) the court states from the 
bench: "(i)t doesn't say that." (T.8 Line 3). 
Mr. Luck respectfully argues on appeal that that is 
what his sworn deposition testimony says, and that it is 
sufficient to create a disputed issue of fact for trial. 
Energy Management Corporation argues that the failure of 
the parties to generate a specific list of events that would 
constitute just cause to terminate the employment, including, 
but not limited to, specification of an exact retirement age 
or date, rendered the offer and acceptance too equivocal and 
unclear to create contractual rights. 
The argument is without merit under Utah employment law. 
No such specific list is required for deciding the issue of 
just cause under Utah law. The just cause issue is routinely 
adjudicated without such a list under the statutes and rules 
governing unemployment insurance benefits in Utah. See 
8 
U - • * • • questior 1 whether an 
e 
just cause iischarge - - employee regularly decided In 
Utah administrative tribunals without reference to any 
e x I id l i s t i vt 11 I'M ' i l l on y I i .I I ! | i < » i ' i 1 n I M . I I r a i l s * ' -v ; . 
The j u s t cause i s s u e i s the same regardless whether 
i "iit 11iisi,i 
wrongful discharge setting, There i s no need for any 
detailed listinq .".•.on and every possible event that would 
C:J: .',-,•• for resi gnati on or discharge. The 
c r e a t i o n :.:-:' r. <., :> ' if* would require superhuman prescience 
and patience unattainable by mere mortals. 
By ruling as a matter withou trial that 
the absence of sue. renders acceptai ice 
too unclear and equivoca > i >i i.ho ;, ,.:ei > of Energy 
Management Corporat .-M omprehend, interpret, or apply, 
the « . mont 
favorable. ; *.. i •, .-- summar>
 ;adgment instead of in 
the light most favorable to Mr. Luck's opposition thereto. 
Furthermore, Energy Management Corporation has not taken 
the position on summary judgment that Mr. Luck retired UJ. 
o 
that there was other just cause for termination. Nor has it 
filed any affidavit by its officers creating a factual 
dispute as to whether the terms of the offer and acceptance 
are too unclear and equivocal for its officers to comprehend, 
interpret, or apply. Had it taken such a position, said 
issues would require a trial of the facts. Instead, it 
simply took the narrow position that Mr. Luck somehow 
remained an at-will employee, regardless of Mr. Luck's 
affidavit and deposition testimony to the contrary, 
and regardless of Mr. Luck's allegations of record to the 
contrary, which Energy Management Corporation never placed 
at issue by affidavit or similar opposing documentation, 
allowing Mr. Luck's allegations to stand under U.R.C.P. 56. 
The at-will issue requires a trial of the facts in 
light of the offer, acceptance, and performance under 
a contract of lifetime employment until retirement for the 
rest of Mr. Luck's career, which must be deemed to exist when 
the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment, and which preclude summary 
judgment under U.R.C.P. 56. Mr. Luck's affidavit and sworn 
deposition testimony entered into the record, together with 
all of the remaining record from the initial complaint 
forward, never opposed by any counter-affidavit or similar 
10 
document from Energy Management Corporation, when viewed 
i 
dispute as whether * employee subject 
to "just because" terminatic - he facts is 
r e q u i r e d t i{t>"(.!MI i • " t 
because" terminatic whether "just cause" for 
termination was required under the exceptior at-will 
e ( i: eed to. 
It was reversible orr^r .mi^* r • * ' / * ^  trial 
Energy Management Corporation and summarr udgment 
as a matter of law without a trial of the facts. 
POINT TWO 
A PUBLIC MuL.iey LXCKPTIUN ro >. i wn.i. MMPLOYMKNT SHOULD 
BE RECOGNIZED UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
Clear and substantial public po] icy exceptions to at-
will employment must, of necessity, require case-by-case 
development „ Peterson. v. Brownirig
 Jr 8'I.".-} 1 t ? d i 2Ho (lit:ah 
1992) Tl lis case presents a situation suitable for further 
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development of public policy exceptions. The right to live 
with a son is a legal right and could be a public duty, 
bringing to bear two of the three public policy categories 
noted in Peterson v. Browning, supra. 
No public policy consideration in employment is stronger 
than the policy of having employees rewarded or punished 
based on individual personal merit, and not for the 
transgressions of their parents, spouses, siblings, children, 
or other members of the employee's household. 
The affidavit of Ken Worton has created a factual 
dispute as to whether Mr. Luck was fired solely or primarily 
because his son had gone to work for a competitor. 
The public policy favoring reliance on individual 
personal merit in employment matters is expressed in various 
ways throughout statutes, constitutions, and case decisions. 
For example, in municipal and other public employment 
settings, there is a policy to avoid discharge based on 
politics, religious belief, or incident to or through changes 
in elective officers, governing bodies, or heads of 
departments. See, inter alia, U.C.A. Sec. 10-3-1106. 
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In the private employment setti ng, b] ack] isting is 
pr oh 3 bi ted \ n 1 ::i =1:1 : Coi 1st a ti :t I:::i 0 1 1 c f I J t: s it: 1 1 1:1: ic:l = i \t'\ i cle XII, 
Section 19, and "just protection" of the ri ghts of labor ' . 
expressly provided for under Article XVI, section 1. 
Just and equitable incentives in private employment 
based on individual merit rather than race, religion, gender, 
1 lati 01 ia] or :i gi 1 1, age c u id o I::l: ler factor s an e fi r nil y embedded 
in constitutional provisions, national, state, and local 
statutes aiiv-i ordinances, and J_H dtie cases construing them. 
Even the selection of judges I n Utah has moved away from 
the old "a ] awyer who knew a governor11 definition o 
to the use of screening panels to consider individual me] -
x weigh! whether to 1 1 ti ] :ii z e th :i s c: ase for I hi • purpose 
of case-by-case development and recognize I n the decision in 
this case a new public policy exception to at-wil 1 
employment, :ii t: :i 3 c] e a r f 1: o m t::l: 1 = f o r e g o i 1 1 g t::l ia t :i t i s tl ie 
publi c policy of this state to encourage the use of 
individual merit i n employment decisions, and there Is no 
i | i>i i i l r c . i s n n in Il I 11 M I I I M I I I I'll 1 in I p o r s n i M I m r r i l v.. 
unconscionably disregarded when -vas fired solely or 
primarily because of his son's conduct, and this case should 
be decided in a way that creates a precedent favoring 
use of individual personal merit in employment decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment should be reversed for a trial on 
the offer and acceptance of lifetime employment for the rest 
of Mr. Luck's career until retirement and on the firing of 
Mr. Luck solely or primarily based on the conduct of his son, 
with instruction that such a discharge invokes a public 
policy exception to at-will employment. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of 
!OPIER 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
\ I : i i idings of Fact at id Conclusions of Law. 
B A i "'II ' i ' :lc: ii It o I ' Ste e I i icl : 
C Affidavit: o f Kei i Worton. 
Defendar- memorandum pp. 0-4 (citing to deposition of Steve Luck). 
Dale A. Kimball (1809) 
Mark E. Wilkey (4167) 
Heidi E. C. Leithead (5102) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVE LUCK, | 
Plaintiff, | FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
| CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. J 
ENERGY MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, | Civil No. 910906921 CV 
Defendant. ! The Honorable Homer Wilkinson 
After reviewing the memoranda submitted by the parties and hearing oral argument 
thereon, this Court entered an Order granting the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by 
defendant Energy Management Corporation and entering judgment in favor of defendant and 
against plaintiff. The grounds for the Court's Order are as follows: 
Findings of Fact 
1. Plaintiff Steve Luck ("Luck") was hired as the service manager and special 
projects engineer at Energy Management Corporation ("EMC") in July 1990. 
2. EMC terminated Luck's employment in July 1991. 
3. Luck had no written employment contract with EMC. The sole basis alleged for 
an employment agreement with EMC was Luck's alleged oral conversations with Mr. Steve 
Rossiter ("Rossiter"). 
4. In Luck's conversations with Rossiter, Rossiter never agreed to limit the grounds 
for which he could terminate Luck. Nor did Rossiter specify any definite term for Luck's 
employment. 
5. Luck suggests that both he and Rossiter expressed their optimism and hope that 
the employment relationship would last for the rest of his life or until his retirement, but no 
clear and unequivocal term was ever articulated. The parties never discussed any specific age 
of retirement nor any definite term of employment. Nor did the parties ever discuss the grounds 
or circumstances under which Luck could be terminated. 
6. Luck has failed to provide this Court with any provision of any EMC employment 
manual or other documents that purports to limit or modify EMC's right to discharge its 
employees at-will. 
Conclusions of Law 
1. Under Utah law, there is a presumption that all employment relationships are 
terminable at will by either party. Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991). 
2. Under Sanderson v. First Security Leasing Co., 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (1992), 
and Hodgson v. Bunzi Utah, Inc., 202 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (1992), oral statements can rebut the 
at-will presumption only if they are "clear and unequivocal" sufficiently definite to operate as 
a contract provision, and clearly communicate the employer's intent to offer employment other 
than at-will. 
cmcUuck-OiO.chd 2 
3. Plaintiff has failed to present this Court with any clear and unequivocal oral 
statements indicating that EMC intended to depart from the presumptive at-will employment 
relationship. 
4. Plaintiff has failed to provide this Court with any legal support for his claim that 
an expression of hope for employment for the rest of his life or until retirement is sufficiently 
definite to operate as a contract provision. 
5. Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of rebutting the at-will presumption that 
exists in Utah. 
6. Plaintiff has failed to establish any basis for his position that he was terminated 
in violation of public policy. 
7. There are no genuine issues of material fact that would preclude entry of summary 
judgment in favor of defendant. 
ENTERED this j £ f ^ d a y of March, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
Homer Wilkinson 
District Court Judge 
emc\luck-010.chd 3 
ROBERT H. COPIER - #727 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-0099 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVE LUCK, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ENERGY MANAGEMENT CORP., 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF BTEVE LUCK 
IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S SUMMARY | JUDGMENT MOTION 
1 Civil No. C91-6921 
1 Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
STEVE LUCK, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as 
follows: 
1. I am the plaintiff in this action. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the discussions that 
took place between the plaintiff and defendant in this 
action, because I am the plaintiff and I participated in them 
with the president of Energy Management Corporation. At no 
time before or during my employment did anyone allege that my 
employment was at-will. Instead, the president of Energy 
Management Corporation and I stated to each other that I 
would work for Energy Management Corporation until I retired. 
1 
3.1 have personal knowledge concerning my performance 
as an employee, because I personally engaged in such job 
performance. The president often told me I was doing a good job 
and expressed gratitude that I would be working for him for the 
rest of my career. Based on my personal knowledge, said 
employment performance was satisfactory, and there was no just 
cause to terminate my employment with Energy Management 
Corporation. 
DATED this q — day of February, 1993. 
£TEVE LUCK ^~~^y 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public of 
the State of Utah, on this the *)**• day of February, 1993. 
• » ' •*>.. ct: t r : • rat. cr:< rs» < 
es I A V ^ Y W y I--'C":-•'.:•.;•;:!:-. L-xpir  
X ^ J " ^ 'Miic c: Utah 
e=?r rw i ta~. «u •or r t c «M> a w »** 
/tOAlfc, y^'-£{jyUn<Krh 
Y PUBLIC 
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ROBERT H. COPIER - #727 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-0099 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVE LUCK, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ; 
ENERGY MANAGEMENT CORP., 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF KEN WORTON 
1 Civil No. C91-6921 
I Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
KEN WORTON, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as 
follows: 
1. I was employed by Energy Management Corporation as 
a sales engineer at the time Steve Luck's employment with Energy 
Management Corporation was terminated on or about July 9, 1991. 
2. On or about July 9, 1991, Steve Rossiter, the 
President of Energy Management Corporationf told me, in a 
discussion at the company offices that included just the two of 
us, that Steve Luckfs employment with the Company had been 
terminated, and he concluded the discussion with the statement 
that "we just canft have someone working for us who lives with 
1 
someone working for them." I knew on or about July 9, 1991, that 
Steve Luckfs son, who lived with Steve Luck, had recently gone to 
work for a competitor. 
3. At a later date, I learned that Steve Luck had 
asserted a claim for wrongful termination against Energy 
Management Corporation. A short time after that, I received an 
employment manual amendment stating that employment with the 
company was at-will. 
DATED this O day of February, 1993. 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me, this X day of 
February, 1993. 
My Commission Expires: 
~;::—\ 
til *(£;£•':•'* \-\ S-.V-vwi'rc . i,»T i 
5 : c»v: :•.-:.• u O i | . 
3 
STATE OF UTAH 
ICCCWQ*. /^cTft^AU)^^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Salt Lake City, UT 
2 
EMC as an independent contractor, Rossiter allegedly approached Luck about becoming a full-
time EMC employee: 
Q. And what did Steve say during that meeting? 
A He offered me an increase in pay, and at the time he offered to - asked me if I 
would consider then totally making the commitment to go to them and work for the rest 
of my life. And his words were, I don't want you to quit. If you're going to work for 
me, I want you to stay. 
* * * * 
We kind of had a running - not really a joke, but a running statement that was you've 
got me for the rest of my life. And he would say you're not going to quit. And I would 
say no, you've got me until I retire. And his answer was great, that's the way I want 
it. At that time, he made me the service manager and special projects manager. 
* * * * 
Q. Did you discuss during that meeting with Steve any circumstances under which you could 
resign? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you have any discussion with Steve about circumstances under which you could be 
terminated or fired? 
A. No. He emphasized the fact that he didn't want me to quit and leave him high and dry. 
I told him at the time, I said in five years I'll be almost 55 years old. That's a poor time 
to be out looking for another job. 
* * * * 
Q. Did you have any understanding that you could be terminated from EMC? 
A. Not from him. I mean obviously any employee understands that if he messes up or if 
the company goes bankrupt or whatever they're not going to be there. I felt very 
confident that I would be there quite a while just on the basis of the customers that would 
call and ask for my assistance. 
e\emc-l027.hcl 
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Q. Okay. So you understood that if your work performance was not satisfactory you could 
be terminated? 
A. Sure. 
Q. That was based on your previous work experience or just your subjective — 
A. Common sense. 
* * * * 
Q You've indicated both that you had a contract for life and a contract until 
retirement. Is there a distinction in your mind between the two? 
A. Well, excuse me. Let me rephrase that. It was my understanding that I had a contract 
with Energy Management until the day I retired, which in my mind was 65 years old. 
Q. And when you say a contract for life, what you mean is a contract until you retire at 
approximately 65 years of age? 
A. Yes. Sixty-five or 70. 
Q. Did you ever have any discussions with Steve Rossiter or anyone else about the age at 
which you would retire? 
A. No. 
Luck Depo. at 15-18, 65-66.4 
Thus, Luck asserts two bases to support his claims: (1) that he had a contract of 
employment with EMC that could only be terminated for cause, see Complaint at K 2, or (2) that 
he had a contract of employment until retirement at age 65 or 70, see Luck Depo. at 65-66. 
4
 Luck also testified that he had never seen any employee bulletins or personnel manuals that 
limited EMC's right to discharge its employees. Further, Luck testified that he was not aware 
of any termination procedure followed by EMC. Luck Depo. at 37. 
e\emc-l027.hcl 
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Rule 55 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 498 
the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar 
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the 
judgment docket 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985 ) 
Rule 55. Default 
(a) Default. 
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judg-
ment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to 
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these 
rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk 
shall enter his default 
(2) Notice to party in default. After the 
entry of the default of any party, as provided m 
Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be nec-
essary to give such party in default any notice of 
action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice 
or paper otherwise required by these rules to be 
served on a party to the action or proceeding, 
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or 
in the event that it is necessary for the court to 
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of 
damages of the nondefaulting party 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be en-
tered as follows 
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim 
against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a 
sum which can by computation be made certain, 
and the defendant has been personally served 
otherwise than by publication or by personal ser-
vice outside of this state, the clerk upon request 
of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the 
amount due and costs against the defendant, if 
he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if 
he is not an infant or incompetent person 
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party 
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to 
the court therefor If, in order to enable the court 
to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is 
necessary to take an account or to determine the 
amount of damages or to establish the truth of 
any averment by evidence or to make an investi-
gation of any other matter, the court may con-
duct such hearings or order such references as it 
deems necessary and proper 
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown 
the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a 
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise 
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b) 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claim-
ants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the 
party entitled to the judgment by default is a plain-
tiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded 
a cross-claim or counterclaim In all cases a judgment 
by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c) 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or 
agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be en-
tered against the state of Utah or against an officer or 
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his 
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the 
court 
(Amended effective Sept 4, 1985 ) 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon 
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a 
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expi-
ration of 20 days from the commencement of the ac-
tion or after service of a motion for summary judg-
ment by the adverse party, move with or without sup-
porting affidavits for a summary judgment m his fa-
vor upon all or any part thereof 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a 
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a sum-
mary judgment in his favor as to all or any part 
thereof 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The mo-
tion shall be served at least 10 days before the time 
fixed for the hearing The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine 
issue as to the amount of damages 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on 
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon 
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is 
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by 
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it 
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable as-
certain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and 
in good faith controverted It shall thereupon make 
an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which 
the amount of damages or other relief is not in contro-
versy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just Upon the trial of the action the 
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the 
trial shall be conducted accordingly 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; de-
fense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and 
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein Sworn or cer-
tified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to 
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith The court may permit affidavits to be sup-
plemented or opposed by depositions, answers to in-
terrogatories, or further affidavits When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as pro-
vided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it 
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the 
court may refuse the application for judgment or may 
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be ob-
tained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it ap-
pear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that 
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of 
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party em-
ploying them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affida-
vits caused him to incur, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may 
be adjudged guilty of contempt 
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